Maybe Once, Maybe Twice: Using the Rule of
Lenity to Determine Whether 18 USC § 924(c)
Defines One Crime or Two
F. ItaliaPattit

INTRODUCTION

Suppose that a drug dealer in Los Angeles goes to meet a
buyer. The dealer possesses a handgun and intends to use the
gun if the buyer does not pay him. He hands drugs to the buyer.
The buyer refuses to pay. The dealer tells the buyer that he has
a gun and that he will use it if the buyer does not pay. The buyer
pays the dealer. They go their separate ways. The Los Angeles
drug dealer faces a mandatory minimum penalty of five years
for the role that the gun played in this drug transaction.1
Now suppose the exact same transaction occurs in Minneapolis. The Minneapolis drug dealer could face a sentence six
times as severe: one mandatory minimum penalty of five years
for the first violation, possessing the gun during a drug trafficking crime, and another mandatory minimum penalty of twentyfive years for the second violation, using the gun in furtherance of
that drug trafficking crime. 2 This disparity3 stems from ambiguous
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1 See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A) (establishing a mandatory minimum penalty of five
years for the first offense of "any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ...uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of
any such crime, possesses a firearm").
2 See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C) ("In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under
this subsection, the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 25 years.").
3 There is broad agreement that geographic sentencing disparities are problematic.
See, for example, Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1, 4 (1988) (arguing that one of Congress's primary purposes in enacting the new federal sentencing statute "was to reduce
[the] 'unjustifiably wide' sentencing disparity"); United States Sentencing Commission,
Proposed Sentencing Guideline for United States Courts, Dissenting View of Commis.
sioner Paul H. Robinson, 52 Fed Reg 3919, 3986-88 (1987) (criticizing the Sentencing
Guidelines in part because they do not do enough to decrease the disparity and may actually
increase it). Consider Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich, Disparity: Not a Reason to "Fix"
Booker, 18 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 160, 160-61 (2006) (arguing that the concern about
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language in 18 USC § 924(c).4 Section 924(c) proscribes "during
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking ...
us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm, or ... in furtherance of any such
crime, possess[ing] a firearm."'5 Some courts-including the
Seventh6 and Ninth Circuits7-interpret the provision as defining a single crime that could be committed by either using a
firearm during a crime or possessing a firearm in furtherance of
a crime. Other courts-including the Fifth,8 Sixth, 9 Eighth,o
Tenth," and Eleventh Circuits12--read the provision as defining
two separate crimes, one for use of a firearm during a crime and
another for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime. 13
regional disparity, while somewhat overblown, is not entirely unwarranted, but also noting
that the concern is not a sufficient justification for changing sentencing laws).
4
There is also disagreement over whether a single drug trafficking offense can be
the predicate offense for more than one § 924(c) conviction, which contributes to this disparity. See United States v Diaz, 592 F3d 467, 471-74 (3d Cir 2010) (collecting cases).
The Eighth Circuit interprets § 924(c) as defining two separate crimes. See United States
v Gamboa, 439 F3d 796, 808-09 (8th Cir 2006). The court also allows a single drug trafficking offense to be the predicate offense for multiple § 924(c) convictions. See United
States v Lucas, 932 F2d 1210, 1223 (8th Cir 1991) ("[Tlhese separate uses [of firearms]
properly support separate section 924(c) charges, even though both of the charges relate
to the same predicate offense."). The combined effect of these two interpretations of
§ 924(c) is that the Minneapolis drug dealer potentially faces a thirty-year sentence for
actions that some circuits classify as a single crime warranting only a five-year sentence.
5 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
6
See, for example, United States v Haynes, 582 F3d 686, 703 (7th Cir 2009).
7 See, for example, United States v Arreola, 467 F3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir 2006).
8 See, for example, United States v Owens, 224 Fed Appx 429, 430 (5th Cir 2007).
9 See, for example, United States v Combs, 369 F3d 925, 933 (6th Cir 2004).
10 See, for example, United States v Gamboa, 439 F3d 796, 810 (8th Cir 2006).
11 See, for example, United States v Lott, 310 F3d 1231, 1246 (10th Cir 2002).
12 See, for example, United States v Timmons, 283 F3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir 2002).
13 The First and Fourth Circuits have acknowledged that there is disagreement as
to how many crimes § 924(c) defines but have not answered the question. See United
States v Ayala-Lopez, 493 Fed Appx 120, 127 n 2 (1st Cir 2012) ("Nor is it necessary here
to determine whether § 924(c)(1)(A) creates two separate offenses or merely specifies two
separate means of committing a single offense."); United States v Robinson, 627 F3d 941,
954 (4th Cir 2010) ('The circuit courts are divided on whether § 924(c) creates one ofThe question is whether that difference matters here. We do not think
fense or two ....
that it does, and so we need not decide how many offenses § 924(c) creates."). But see
United States v Woods, 271 Fed Appx 338, 343 (4th Cir 2008) (stating its agreement with
the circuits that have concluded that § 924(c) defines two offenses without elaborating on
its reasoning, because the determination was irrelevant to the question before the court).
The Third Circuit briefly addressed the question of how many crimes § 924(c) defines.
See United States v Pryor, 195 Fed Appx 65, 69 (3d Cir 2006) ("[Section 924(c)] therefore
provided for two separate offenses."). But a later opinion from a district court in the
Third Circuit determined that the Third Circuit had not yet addressed the question. See
United States v Johnson, 2010 WL 322143, *7 (WD Pa). The Second Circuit has not
weighed in on how many crimes § 924(c) defines, but "district courts in this circuit have
found the Seventh [Circuit's] and Ninth Circuit's reasoning more persuasive." Johnson v
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There is a mandatory minimum penalty of five years for violating § 924(c). A subsequent conviction incurs a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty-five years. 14 If that subsequent
conviction involves a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a
silencer, the mandatory sentence is life imprisonment. 15 Heightened sentences for a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction
are typically imposed on defendants convicted of violating
§ 924(c) who were also convicted of violating § 924(c) in a previous
case. 16 If § 924(c) defines two distinct crimes, 17 however, separate
convictions for both possessing and using the same firearm in
connection with the same crime could trigger the twenty-fiveyear mandatory minimum for a second conviction. That is precisely the situation that the Minneapolis drug dealer faces.
According to the Eighth Circuit's understanding of § 924(c), the
Minneapolis drug dealer committed two crimes by possessing a
gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and, in mentioning
the gun, also by using it. As a consequence, he can be convicted of
violating § 924(c) twice and face the heightened penalty established for multiple § 924(c) violations.18 By comparison, because
the Ninth Circuit interprets § 924(c) as defining a single crime,
the Los Angeles drug dealer faces five years for conduct that
would lead to a thirty-year sentence in Minneapolis.
Although interpreting § 924(c) as including two crimes frequently leads to longer sentences, defendants have argued that
§ 924(c) defines two crimes because this argument provides a
basis to challenge the indictment. That is, defendants whose
crimes were charged in a single count have argued that § 924(c)
actually defines two distinct crimes and that their indictments
are therefore unconstitutional.19 On the other hand, defendants
charged with two separate crimes have argued that § 924(c)
actually defines a single crime and that their indictments

United States, 2013 WL 103174, *6 n 11 (SDNY) (collecting cases from district courts
within the Second Circuit).
14 See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).
15
See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii).
16 See, for example, United States v Powell, 693 F3d 398, 401 n 4 (3d Cir 2012)
(explaining that the mandatory minimum for a § 924(c) conviction was three hundred
months, or twenty-five years, because the defendant had a previous § 924(c) conviction
on his record).
17 This assumes that one drug trafficking crime can be the predicate offense for two
§ 924(c) violations, which the Eighth Circuit allows. See Lucas, 932 F2d at 1223.
18 See Hamberg v United States, 675 F3d 1170, 1171-73 (8th Cir 2012).
19 See note 42.
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therefore unconstitutionally charge the same crime twice.20
Because courts have reached different conclusions about how
many crimes § 924(c) defines, it is difficult for both defendants
and prosecutors to predict which indictments are constitutional.21
This Comment addresses the question of how many crimes
§ 924(c) defines. Part I explains the history of § 924(c). Part II
considers the disagreement among courts as to how many crimes
§ 924(c) defines and explains that the disagreement persists
because first-order tools of statutory interpretation fail to conclusively resolve this question. Part III argues that because
first-order tools of statutory interpretation do not conclusively
indicate how many crimes § 924(c) defines, courts must look to
second-order tools of statutory interpretation like the canons of
construction. Specifically, this Comment suggests that courts
look to the rule of lenity. This Comment clarifies the rule of lenity,
explaining that it requires courts to interpret statutes so that
they lead to less punishment. Building on that clarification of
the rule of lenity, this Comment argues that courts invoking the
rule of lenity must interpret § 924(c) as defining a single crime
because this interpretation leads to less punishment. This solution is not limited to the question of how many crimes § 924(c)
defines. Courts generally struggle to determine whether a statute
defines two separate crimes or alternative means for committing
a single crime.22 This solution can resolve otherwise intractable
questions of how many crimes any given statute creates.
I. THE HISTORY OF § 924(C)
This Part summarizes the history of § 924(c), explaining the
statutory amendment that led to the current circuit split.
20 See US Const Amend V; 41 Am Jur 2d Indictments and Informations § 205 at
946-47.
21 See Part II.A.
22 For example, 26 USC § 7201 provides that "[a]ny person who willfully attempts
in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof
shall ... be guilty of a felony." Courts disagree about whether the statute creates two
separate crimes (the willful attempt "to evade or defeat any tax" and the willful attempt
to evade or defeat the "payment" of any tax) or a single crime that can be committed two
ways (by either attempting to evade a tax or attempting to evade the payment of a tax).
Compare United States v Dack, 747 F2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir 1984) (interpreting 26 USC
§ 7201 as creating two separate crimes), with United States v Mal, 942 F2d 686, 688 (9th
Cir 1991) (holding that 26 USC § 7201 creates a "single crime of tax evasion"); United
States v Huguenin, 950 F2d 23, 26 (1st Cir 1991) (holding that 26 USC § 7201 does not
necessarily create two separate crimes); United States v Dunkel, 900 F2d 105, 107 (7th
Cir 1990), vacd on other grounds 498 US 1043 (1991) (same).
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As amended in 1998,23 18 USC § 924(c) provided that "any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime," be sentenced to a prison term of between
five and thirty years. Unlike the current version of the statute,
the 1998 version did not mention possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a violent or drug trafficking crime.24 From the
late 1980s through the mid-1990s, circuit courts interpreting the
previous version divided over the proper definition of "use[ I" of a
firearm.25 Courts debated whether mere possession constituted
"use"26 and reached different conclusions about whether guns
that were present but inaccessible (for example, hidden under
mattresses or in dressers) could trigger § 924(c).27
In Bailey v United States,28 the Supreme Court resolved the
circuit split, articulating a narrow definition for "use" of a firearm. The Court held that to establish "use," "the Government
must show that the defendant actively employed the firearm
during and in relation to the predicate crime."29 The Court elaborated, "The active-employment understanding of 'use' certainly
includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and,
most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm."30 Further,
"even an offender's reference to a firearm in his possession" that
23

See An Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub L No 105-386, 112 Stat 3469

(1998), codified at 18 USC § 924(c). The original act provided a mandatory minimum
sentence for anyone who "(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or (2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States." Gun
Control Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-618, 82 Stat 1213, 1224 (1968), codified at 18 USC
§ 921 et seq. Section 924(c) was modified several times between its 1968 enactment and
the 1998 amendment.
24 For the original enactment, see Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat at 1223-24. For
the original codification, see 18 USC § 924(c) (1994).
25 See Bailey v United States, 516 US 137, 142 (1995) (discussing the debate among
the circuit courts); United States v Castro-Lara, 970 F2d 976, 982-83 (1st Cir 1992);
United States v Hager, 969 F2d 883, 888-89 (10th Cir 1992); United States v TorresRodriguez, 930 F2d 1375, 1385-86 (9th Cir 1991); United States v Feliz-Cordero, 859 F2d
250, 254 (2d Cir 1988).
26 Compare Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F2d at 1385, with Castro-Lara,970 F2d at 983.
27 Compare Feliz-Cordero, 859 F2d at 254 (explaining that a firearm that is not
"quickly accessible" does not satisfy § 924(c) "use"), with Hager, 969 F2d at 888-89 (determining that a firearm in "close proximity" satisfies § 924(c) "use").
2s 516 US 137 (1995).
29 Id at 150.
30 Id at 148.
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is "calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of
the predicate offense is a 'use,' just as the silent but obvious and

forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a

'use."'31

However,

the Court noted that "the inert presence of a firearm, without
more," would not constitute "use" for purposes of § 924(c).32
Members of Congress were dissatisfied with this narrow definition because it made it more difficult to prosecute § 924(c) violations. Senator Jesse Helms referred to Bailey as "the Supreme
33
Court's blunder" because of its effect on § 924(c) prosecutions
Congress amended the provision with the explicit intent of making § 924(c) cases easier to prosecute. Senator Michael DeWine
explained, "[Bailey] severely restricted an important tool used by
federal prosecutors to put gun-using drug criminals behind bars.
•.. The question before this Congress for almost four years, two
Senate hearings, and seven bills was how to restore this crime
fighting tool." 34 DeWine also outlined the specific conduct that
the act was intended to reach: "not only instances of brandishing,
firing or displaying a firearm ... but also to those situations
where a defendant kept a firearm available to provide security
... or was otherwise emboldened by its presence in the commission of the offense." 35 The emphasis on situations in which a
firearm was present but not necessarily employed further underscores Congress's intent to overrule Bailey.36 To do so, Congress
replaced the statutory language penalizing anyone who "during
and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime
...uses or carries a firearm"37 with language penalizing anyone
who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm."38

31

Id.

Bailey, 516 US at 149.
A Bill to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, S 43, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong
Rec 470, 764 (Jan 21, 1997) (statement of Senator Jesse Helms). See also United States v
Pleasant, 125 F Supp 2d 173, 180-81 (ED Va 2000) ("The discussions in both the Senate
hearing ... and the House Committee Report ... reflect that Congress was intimately
aware of the decision in Bailey and sought to avoid its restrictive effects.").
34 Bailey "Use or Carry" Firearms Bill, S 191, 105th Cong, 2d Sess, in 144 Cong Rec
S 12670 (daily ed Oct 16, 1998) (statement of Senator Michael DeWine).
35 Id at S 12671 (cited in note 34) (statement of Senator Michael DeWine).
36 See To Provide for Increased Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Criminals Possessing Firearms,and for Other Purposes, HR Rep No 105-344, 105th Cong, 1st Sess 4-5, 14
(1997).
37 18 USC § 924(c) (1994).
38 Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, 112 Stat at 3469.
32
33
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In amending the statute, Congress made sure to capture
more conduct than Bailey's reading of the prior version of the
statute captured. Congress did not make clear, however, if it
intended to capture more conduct by creating an additional
crime or by adding an additional prong to the single crime defined
by § 924(c).
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER How MANY CRIMES § 924(C) DEFINES
Having explained the amendment to § 924(c) that raised the
question of how many crimes that provision defines in Part I,
this Comment turns to the split in the circuit courts that the
amendment engendered. This Part begins by explaining that,
when Congress does not clarify how many crimes a statute defines,
defendants can raise two different and conflicting challenges to
their indictments. In their attempts to respond to these challenges, courts have interpreted the statute using what this
Comment will refer to as "first-order tools of statutory interpretation." These are the tools of statutory interpretation that
courts commonly look to first when faced with statutory interpretation questions. This Part describes the three first-order
tools that courts have relied on in interpreting § 924(c). Next,
it summarizes the decisions of the circuit courts that have addressed the question of how many crimes § 924(c) defines by
invoking these first-order tools. Finally, this Part explains why
the first-order tools of statutory interpretation fail to indicate
how many crimes § 924(c) defines.
A.

Confusion Resulting from Congress's Failure to Specify How
Many Crimes § 924(c) Defines

When Congress does not make clear how many crimes a
statute defines, it opens the door to two different challenges to
indictments brought under the statute. All indictments must follow certain rules. One is avoiding duplicity.39 Another is avoiding multiplicity.40 In the context of § 924(c), duplicity challenges
are warranted only if a statute defines two separate offenses.
Similarly, multiplicity challenges are warranted only if a statute

39 See Gerberdingv United States, 471 F2d 55, 59 (8th Cir 1973) ("[Duplicity's] vice
is that a general verdict will not reveal whether the jury found the defendant guilty of
one crime and not guilty of the other, or guilty of all.").
40 See id at 58 ("'Multiplicity' is the charging of a single offense in several
counts.").
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defines a single offense. By being unclear about how many
crimes § 924(c) defines, Congress has made it possible for some
defendants to raise duplicity challenges (arguing that the statute
defines two crimes) and others to raise multiplicity challenges
(arguing that the statute defines one crime).
An indictment is duplicitous if a single count contains
charges for two or more distinct offenses.41 For example, if multiple blows each constitute a discrete assault, the prosecution
must charge the defendant for each blow in a separate count.
Similarly, assuming that evading arrest and hiding evidence are
separate crimes, a single count of an indictment cannot charge a
defendant with evading arrest and with hiding evidence. The
indictment would need to include one count for evading arrest
and a separate count for hiding evidence. Accordingly, if § 924(c)
defines two crimes, § 924(c) indictments charging both "use" and
"possession" in a single count would be duplicitous.
Duplicity is prohibited because it violates the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.42 The primary constitutional concern with
duplicitous indictments is that they make it difficult for both defendants and jurors to distinguish the crimes that the defendant
has been charged with. A duplicitous indictment undermines a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the charges
against him because it makes it difficult for the defendant to
understand the content of each charge. 43 A duplicitous indictment
also undermines his Sixth Amendment right to conviction only
by a unanimous jury verdict because a jury could find against the
defendant without agreeing about all of the elements of each
crime. 44 A secondary concern is that duplicitous indictments
may lead to double jeopardy violations. 4s A duplicitous indictment
obscures which offense the defendant was actually convicted of. If

41
See Abney v United States, 431 US 651, 654 (1977) (explaining that an indictment was duplicitous because it charged two offenses-a conspiracy offense and an attempt
to violate the Hobbs Act-in a single count). See also 41 Am Jur 2d Indictments and Informations § 207 at 948 (defining duplicity as the charging of two or more distinct offenses
in the same count).
42 US Const Amend V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."); US Const Amend VI ("[T]he accused shall enjoy
the right ...to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.").
43 See Thomas Lundy, Duplicity-PartTwo: A Methodology for Determining When
Specific Juror Unanimity Is Required, 34 The Champion 49, 49 (Dec 2010); 41 Am Jur 2d
Indictments and Informations § 207 at 949 ('The vices of duplicity arise from a breach of
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to know the charges that he or she faces.").
44 See 41 Am Jur 2d Indictments and Informations § 207 at 949.
45 See US Const Amend V.
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the defendant is charged with an additional offense after conviction on a duplicitous count, it may be unclear whether the subsequent charge alleges an offense for which the defendant was
already convicted.46
47
Defendants must raise duplicity challenges before trial. If
they do not, they waive the challenge. 48 If the challenge is unin49
tentionally waived, the plain error standard of review applies.
Under this very deferential standard, the court has the discretion to remedy an error only if the error is obvious and affects
the defendant's substantial rights. 50 Courts exercise this discretion only when the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
51
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
An indictment is multiplicitous if it contains charges for one
offense spread across two or more separate counts. 52 Multiplicity
may result from spreading factual predicates across multiple
counts or, as in United States v Gamboa,53 spreading statutory
elements over multiple counts. 54 For example, if a series of blows
constitutes only one assault, the prosecution may only charge
the defendant with one count of assault. Similarly, consider a
hypothetical crime, the elements of which are evading arrest
and hiding evidence. An indictment charging that crime could
not contain one count for evading arrest and a separate count for
hiding evidence. The indictment would need to charge the single
crime of evading arrest and hiding evidence together in a single
count. Accordingly, if § 924(c) defines a single crime, then
§ 924(c) indictments charging "use" in one count and "possession" in a separate count would be multiplicitous.
Multiplicity violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it exposes defendants to double liability for

46 See Luisa Caro and Alan S. Marzilli, Indictments, 84 Georgetown L J 930, 94748 (1996).
47 See Charles Alan Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal
§ 145 at 97 & n 7 (West 4th ed 2008).
48 See id (explaining that "an objection to duplicity is waived if not raised prior to
trial"). But see id at 97-98 & n 8 (explaining that some courts only consider the objection
waived if it is raised after the verdict).
49 See Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 135 (2009).
50 See id.
51 See id.
52
See 41 Am Jur 2d Indictments and Informations § 205 at 946.
53 439 F3d 796 (8th Cir 2006).
54 See id at 808.
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committing a single offense. 55 Like duplicity challenges, multiplicity challenges must be raised before trial to avoid waiver.56
Defendants charged with "use" and "possession" in a single
count have alleged that their indictments are duplicitous,
whereas defendants charged with "use" and "possession" in different counts have argued that their indictments are multiplicitous. Courts' varied responses to these challenges have led to
judicial disagreement over how many crimes § 924(c) defines.
B.

The First-Order Tools of Statutory Interpretation

To address duplicity and multiplicity challenges, courts
must determine how many crimes § 924(c) defines. Courts depend on legislatures to explain how many discrete crimes a
57
statute creates because there is no natural unit of crime.
Courts deciding this question have relied primarily on three
first-order tools of statutory interpretation: the statute's text
and structure, the statute's legislative history, and the test created in Blockburger v United States.58
Courts' starting point for interpreting a statute, including
determining how many crimes it defines, is the statute's text
and structure. 59 This analysis involves "deriv[ing] meaning from
the internal structure of the text and conventional or dictionary
meanings of the terms used in it."60
Courts also look to a statute's legislative history for insight
into how many crimes it defines.61 The legislative history can include earlier drafts of the law, committee reports, transcripts of
floor debates, and signing statements. 62 A statute's legislative
See Caro and Marzilli, 84 Georgetown L J at 950 (cited in note 46).
See Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure:Criminal § 145 at 102-03
(cited in note 47).
57 See Sanabriav United States, 437 US 54, 69-70 (1978) ("It is Congress... which
establishes and defines offenses ....
Whether a particular course of conduct involves one
or more distinct 'offenses' under the statute depends on this congressional choice.").
58 284 US 299 (1932).
59 See Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:1 at 1 (West 7th ed 2007) ("When an authoritative written text of the law
has been adopted, the particular language of the text is always the starting point on any
question concerning the application of the law.").
60 Id at § 45:12 at 133.
61 See id at § 45:38 at 542 ("Historical information is an important source of insight
and enlightenment about most human affairs.... [A]nyone faced with a legal problem can
appreciate the relevance of information about circumstances which led to the enactment of
a statute.").
62 See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833, 1872 (1998).
55

56
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history can be probative of how many crimes it defines if reports
or debates contain explicit references to the number of crimes or
discussions of the mechanics of prosecution at a level of detail
that reveals whether different prongs of the statute are intended
to be treated as separate crimes.63
Finally, courts examining § 924(c) have relied on the Blockburger test to determine how many crimes a statute defines. In
Blockburger, the Court announced a test that is used to determine
whether prosecution under two statutory provisions violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 64 If the two provisions create two separate crimes, prosecution under both provisions does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. If they create the same crime,
prosecution under both provisions violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Under the Blockburger test, "to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one," courts ask "whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."65 If each provision depends on unique proof, they define separate crimes and
there is no double jeopardy bar to prosecuting a defendant under
each provision.
Cases Holding that § 924(c) Defines a Single Offense

C.

Relying on the first-order tools explained above, the Ninth
and Seventh Circuits have interpreted § 924(c) as defining a
single crime.
In United States v Arreola,66 Jose Arreola met undercover
officer Roberto Martinez in a parking lot.67 Arreola invited
Martinez into the back of his car, where he offered to sell the
undercover officer seventy ounces of heroin.68 A team of officers
then arrested Arreola.69 A later search revealed that there was a
semiautomatic handgun in the glove compartment of Arreola's
car, within easy access of his associates, who were sitting in the
1
front seats.7 0 Arreola had an extra magazine in his pocket7

63

See Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 2.2(e) at 128-32 (West 2d ed

2003) (surveying the role of legislative history in the statutory interpretation of criminal law).
64 US Const Amend V.
65 Blockburger, 284 US at 304.
66 467 F3d 1153 (9th Cir 2006).
67 See id at 1155.
68

Id.

69

Id.
See Arreola, 467 F3d at 1155.
Id.

70
71
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The prosecution charged Arreola with violating § 924(c) two
different ways in a single count. Count three of the indictment
charged that Arreola "did knowingly and intentionally use and
carry the firearm discussed below during and in relation to, and
possessed the same firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking
crimes set forth in Counts One and Two of this Indictment. 72 In
a direct appeal of his conviction after trial, Arreola challenged
his indictment on the basis of duplicity7 That is, he alleged that
the prosecution had charged him with two separate crimes in a
74
single count.
The court applied the Ninth Circuit's United States v UCO
OiJ75 test to determine how many crimes § 924(c) defines.76 The
test's first two factors evaluate a statute's language and legislative history. The third and fourth ask a question similar to that
asked by the Blockburger test: whether the provisions proscribe
sufficiently distinct conduct to permit the defendant to be
charged under both. Analyzing the first factor, the Arreola court
determined that the statutory language does not clearly indicate
that § 924(c) creates two separate offenses. The court observed
that, while the statute defines two distinct acts,7 7 two distinct
acts sometimes constitute a single crime.78 The Arreola court also
considered the statute's structure, observing that "Congress
could have chosen ... to create separate sub-parts, which would
have presented a stronger argument that it creates separate offenses, but it did not."79 Second, the court examined the legislative history (including earlier drafts of the bill and the House
Report) and determined that it "does not conclusively support either interpretation, but tends to suggest that Congress intended
to create a single offense," because Congress did not adopt a
72

Id at 1155-56.

73 Id at 1156, 1161.
74 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1156, 1161.
75 546 F2d 833 (9th Cir 1976).
76 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1157, citing UCO Oil, 546 F2d at 836-37. The court described the prongs as the 'language of the statute"; "the legislative history and statutory
context"; "whether the statute proscribes 'distinctly different kinds of conduct,"' or conduct
that falls "'within the conventional understanding' of one crime"; and, finally, the "appropriateness of multiple punishment[s] for the conduct charged." Arreola, 467 F3d at 1157-60,
quoting UCO Oil, 546 F2d at 836-37.
77 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1158 ("[W]hile it is clear ... that § 924(c) names two distinct
acts, it does not create two separate offenses.").
78 Id, citing United States v Street, 66 F3d 969, 974 (8th Cir 1995) (clarifying that
multiple "acts of violation in one sentence" of a statute that imposes a single penalty for
all violations constitutes a single offense).
79 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1157.
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proposal that would have explicitly separated the two prongs into
separate offenses80
After examining the text and legislative history, the court
turned to the two factors that are similar to the Blockburger
test. The court looked at "whether the statute proscribes 'distinctly different kinds of conduct,' or whether the proscribed
conduct is 'regarded as [falling] within the conventional understanding' of one crime."81 The court found that, because the conduct proscribed by the two parts of § 924(c) is "difficult to distinguish conceptually," the third UCO Oil factor indicates that
§ 924(c) must create a single crime s 2 Finally, the court considered
"the 'appropriateness of multiple punishment[s] for the conduct
charged in the indictment."'83 The court explained that it would
be "absurd" to impose multiple punishments on a defendant who
violated both prongs of § 924(c) because "the [defendant] could

be punished twice for one contiguous

act."84

Weighing these factors, the court determined that § 924(c)
defines a single offense.85 It thus upheld Arreola's conviction
against his duplicity challenge.86 For all six counts of the conviction, including one count for violating § 924(c), Arreola received
87
a total sentence of approximately sixteen years.
In United States v Haynes,88 the Seventh Circuit also concluded that § 924(c) defines one offense.89 From at least 1999
through 2005, the four Haynes defendants--corrupt police officers
and drug dealers-were involved in a criminal enterprise.90
Working off information from the drug dealers, the police officers
would conduct traffic stops and illegal searches of the residences
80 Id at 1158-59, citing S 191, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec 633 (Jan 22,
1997); HR 424, 105th Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec 153 (Jan 9, 1997); HR 424, 105th
Cong, 1st Sess, in 143 Cong Rec H 9557 (Oct 24, 1997); 144 Cong Rec at 532 (statement
of Representative Waters); id at 534 (statement of Representative McCollum); HR Rep
No 105-344 at 11-13 (cited in note 36).
81 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1159, quoting UCO Oil, 546 F2d at 837.
82 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1160.
83 Id, quoting UCO Oil, 546 F2d at 837-38.
84 Arreola, 467 F3d at 1160.
85 Id at 1161.
86 Id.
87 Appellant's Opening Brief, United States v Arreola, Appeal No 04-10504, *2 (9th
Cir filed Sept 21, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 3755662) (noting that Arreola
received a sentence of 190 months).
88 582 F3d 686 (7th Cir 2009), vacd on other grounds, United States v Vizcarra, 668
F3d 516 (7th Cir 2012).
89 Haynes, 582 F3d at 703.
90 Id at 692-93.
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of other drug dealers. 91 They seized drugs and money, keeping
the money and selling the drugs.92
Eural Black, one of the police officers, carried his service
weapon with him during these raids; the court concluded that
"[a] reasonable jury could have found that Black carried his police
handgun in order to make it appear that he was a legitimate cop
performing legitimate police work." 93 Of course, "[n]one of this
was legitimate law enforcement activity."94
He filed a direct appeal of his conviction,95 challenging his
indictment on the basis of duplicity.96 Counts four and seven of
the indictment-which pertained to separate incidents-each
charged that Black "knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of, and used, carried, and brandished a firearm during and
in relation to, a drug trafficking crime."97 Black alleged that each
of these counts was duplicitous because it charged two different
98
crimes in a single count.
Unlike in Arreola, the Haynes court did not engage in a finegrained analysis of § 924(c). The court noted that because Black
did not raise his duplicity challenge before trial, the issue was
waived and the deferential plain error standard of review applied.99
Applying this deferential standard, the court simply stated that
the Seventh Circuit had "not decided that § 924(c) criminalizes
two separate and distinct offenses.100 The court observed that
prior Seventh Circuit jurisprudence "suggests that § 924(c)
charges one offense that may be committed in more ways than
one."'101 The court further concluded that there was no plain error
in the indictment or instructions and upheld Black's conviction

91
92

Id at 693.

Id.

93 Haynes, 582 F3d at 703.
94 Idat 693.
95 Idat 692.
96 There were four defendants in Haynes, but the § 924(c) duplicity analysis applied
only to Black's conviction. See id at 703-04. One other defendant appealed his conviction
under § 924(c) but did not raise the question of how many crimes § 924(c) defines. See id
at 707-08.
97 Haynes, 582 F3d at 703.
98

Id.

99 Id. Although applying the plain error standard would be proper in all cases in
which defendants raise duplicity and multiplicity issues for the first time after trial, the
Haynes court emphasized that it was applying a deferential standard. Id.
100 Id.
101 Haynes, 582 F3d at 703. No other Seventh Circuit case provides a more detailed
analysis.
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against his duplicity challenge.02 Black received a total sentence
of forty years, including approximately twenty-five years for
violating § 924(c).103
D.

Cases Holding that § 924(c) Defines Two Separate Offenses

Also relying on the first-order tools of statutory interpretation, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
interpreted § 924(c) as defining two crimes.
In United States v Gamboa, o4 officers searched Michael
Gerald Gamboa's business for evidence of drug trafficking
activity.105 They had been investigating him for approximately a
year as the leader of a methamphetamine-trafficking operation.o The officers seized "nine firearms, more than 500 grams
of methamphetamine, and over $9,000 in cash."107
The prosecution charged Gamboa with violating § 924(c) two
different ways in two different counts. 0 8 Count four of the indictment charged that Gamboa knowingly used and carried firearms during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime
charged in count one. 109 Count five charged that Gamboa possessed a firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking crimes
charged in count one. 110 In a direct appeal of his conviction,
Gamboa raised a multiplicity objection to the indictment."'
To resolve Gamboa's appeal and determine if his indictment
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the court first applied the
Blockburger test to decide whether § 924(c) defines one crime or
two." 2 The court explained, "Count Four does require at least
one element not required in Count Five. Count Four requires a
finding that Gamboa 'used and carried' the firearms, while
Count Five merely requires possession." 113 Similarly, the court
noted, "Count Five charged possession 'in furtherance of' a drug
Id at 704.
103 Id at 697. See also Opening Brief and Argument for Eural Black DefendantAppellant, United States v Black, Nos 08-1616, 08-1466, 08-1608, 08-1617, *13 (7th Cir
filed Dec 18, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 5794006).
104 439 F3d 796 (8th Cir 2006).
105 Id at 801.
102

108
107

Id.
Id.

108

See Gamboa, 439 F3d at 808-09.

109 Id at 809.

110 Id at 809-10.
111 Id at 808-09.
112 Gamboa, 439 F3d at 809.
113 Id at 810.
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trafficking crime, while Count Four charged ... use[ ] ... 'during
and in relation to' a drug trafficking crime," and "'in furtherance
of requires a slightly higher standard of participation than ..

'during and in relation

to."'114

On this basis, the court deter-

mined that count five required an element that count four did
not. The court therefore concluded that § 924(c) defines two separate offenses."' It upheld Gamboa's conviction against his multiplicity challenge. Gamboa received a thirty-year sentence for
count four and life in prison for count five.116
In United States v Combs,117 the Sixth Circuit also determined that § 924(c) defines two crimes. Sometime in 2000 or
2001, Leon Combs gave Josh Miller drugs in exchange for three
rifles.118 Miller alerted the police and explained that he had given
Combs guns in exchange for drugs on several occasions.119 When
the police searched Combs's house and person, they found a

loaded pistol and OxyContin and Dialudid

pills.120

The prosecution charged Combs with two violations of
§ 924(c). Count four alleged that "Combs 'in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime ... did unlawfully possess firearms'"..; this
allegation stemmed from the trade with Miller of drugs for
guns. 121 Count three alleged that "Combs 'during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime ... did possess a ... pistol"'; this allegation stemmed from the ensuing police search.122 Combs filed a
114

Id.

115 Id. In addition to using the Blockburger test to answer a question that the test is

not equipped to address, the Gamboa court likely misapplied the Blockburger test. See Part
II.E.3. Under Blockburger, the relevant question is whether each element requires unique
proof, not whether each offense has a unique element. See Blockburger, 284 US at 304.
116 Amended Judgment as to Michael Gerald Gamboa, United States v Gamboa,
Docket No 3:02-cr-00047-RRE, *3 (D ND filed June 8, 2006).
117 369 F3d 925 (6th Cir 2004).
118 Id at 930.
119 Id.
120

Id.

Combs, 369 F3d at 930.
Id. Although the Combs court analyzed how many crimes § 924(c) defines, this
discussion may be dicta because there was another basis for dismissing Combs's indictment. Count three of Combs's indictment charged Combs with possession of a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The prosecution borrowed one element
from each prong of § 924(c). The text of the indictment in count four is parallel to the indictment in Arreola, but, as the court explained, the jury instructions on count four also
borrowed one element from each prong. See id at 934-35. The jury instructions on count
four concerned the court in the same way as the text of count three. Id. Regardless of
whether § 924(c) defines one crime or two, the legislative history clearly suggests that
the prosecution cannot borrow one element from each prong: "[Slomeone who possesses a
gun that has nothing to do with the crime does not fall under 924(c)." 144 Cong Rec at S
12671 (cited in note 34) (statement of Senator DeWine). Congress was concerned about
121
122
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direct appeal of his conviction.123 In his appeal, he alleged that
counts three and four each inappropriately mixed the elements
124
of two separate crimes into a single count.
Although Combs's challenge was not strictly a duplicity
challenge, the court analyzed how many crimes § 924(c) defines
and determined that "[t]he issue of whether or not § 924(c) criminalizes two distinct offenses directs the outcome of Combs's
primary challenges to his conviction."125 In doing so, the Combs
court, like the Arreola court, looked to the statutory text, legislative history, and proof required for each offense.126 Of the statutory text, the court said, "The two prongs of the statute are separated by the disjunctive 'or,' which ...suggests the separate
prongs must have different meanings."127
Assessing the legislative history, the court opined, "By its
adding possession as a prohibited act, and requiring a higher
standard of participation to charge a defendant with the act, we
understand Congress to have delineated a new offense within
the same statute."128
The court also determined that each prong required unique
proof because, it posited, "use" connotes more than mere possession, and "in furtherance of' connotes a higher standard of participation than "during and in relation to."129 After reviewing these
factors, the court held that § 924(c) defines two separate offenses.130
The court reversed Combs's conviction, providing two explanations: first, because the indictment charged a single crime in two
counts, and second, because counts three and four both used one
element from each prong of § 924(c) (charging possession of a
weapon during a crime, rather than possession in furtherance of
or use during commission of a crime).3' Of the circuit court cases
that have interpreted how many crimes § 924(c) defines, Combs

prosecuting defendants "where there is [ ] an insufficient nexus between the crime and
the gun," which suggests that Congress may not have intended to criminalize possession
during (as opposed to possession in furtherance of or use during) a covered crime. Id.
123 Combs, 369 F3d at 929.
124 See Appellant Leon Combs's Final Brief in Support of Appeal, United States v
Combs, No 01-5997, *22 (6th Cir filed Aug 20, 2002) (available on Westlaw at 2002 WL
34204120).
125 Combs, 369 F3d at 930.
126 See id at 931-33.
127 Id at 931.
128 Id at 932.
129 See Combs, 369 F3d at 932-33,
130 Id at 933.
131 See id at 934-35.

1278

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1261

is the only one to reverse the defendant's conviction on the
ground that the indictment charged the incorrect number of
crimes. However, nothing changed for the defendant as a result
of winning his duplicity challenge. After remand the prosecution
reindicted Combs on the two firearms charges.132 It properly
charged him with the two separate § 924(c) violations committed
on two separate occasions (trading drugs for guns with Josh Miller
and possessing firearms and pills).133 He was convicted of both
violations34 and sentenced to five years for the "use and carry" of
a firearm and twenty-five years for "possessing three firearms."135
Although winning the duplicity challenge put Combs in the
same position he would have been in had he never raised the challenge, it could have put him in a worse position. Because the
Sixth Circuit interprets § 924(c) as defining two separate offenses,
Combs could have been indicted with an additional count of violating § 924(c). Recall that Combs gave Miller drugs in exchange
for rifles.136 This trade involved both the use of a firearm during
1
a drug trafficking crime (because the firearm was bartered) 37
and the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (because the firearm advanced the trade).18 The trade
could thus constitute a violation of each of the separate crimes
that § 924(c) defines. Combs was fortunate not to face separate
charges for both "use" and "possession" of a firearm when he was
reindicted. Being indicted for two crimes instead of one, and
consequently facing a longer sentence, is a real risk of winning a
duplicity challenge.
The courts in United States v Lott, 1 9 United States v Timmons,1 40 and United States v Owens4l found that § 924(c) defines
two separate crimes without any analysis. In Lott, the Tenth
Circuit simply said, "This count included two distinct offenses
for which the jury could have found Gary Lott guilty."142 Lott
132 United States v Combs, 218 Fed Appx 483, 484 (6th Cir 2007).
133

Id.

134 Id.
135 Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v Combs, No 6:04-cr-00054-DCREBA, *1-2 (ED Ky filed Dec 27, 2004).
136 Combs, 369 F3d at 930.
137 See Bailey, 516 US at 148 ('The active-employment understanding of 'use' certainly includes.., bartering.").
138 See Combs, 369 F3d at 933.
139 310 F3d 1231 (10th Cir 2002).
140 283 F3d 1246 (11th Cir 2002).
141 224 Fed Appx 429 (5th Cir 2007).
142 Lott, 310 F3d at 1246.
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was sentenced to concurrent life sentences for various drug trafficking crimes and a consecutive five-year sentence for violating
§ 924(c).143 In Timmons, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded as if
§ 924(c) creates distinct offenses but did not analyze the issue.144
Timmons received a total sentence of approximately fifteen
years for two counts of possession with intent to distribute and
two counts of violating § 924(c) (he was acquitted of one count of
violating § 924(c), but the judge used the conduct charged to enhance his sentence).,45 In Owens, the Fifth Circuit said that
"'[section] 924(c) criminalizes two separate offenses-(1) using or
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime, and (2) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime."'146 The court explained that "[t]he indictment did
not charge Owens with using or carrying a firearm. Thus, we
assume arguendo that the indictment charged Owens with pos147
sessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime."'
Owens was charged with only one count of violating § 924(c), for
148
which he was sentenced to five years.
E.

The First-Order Tools of Statutory Interpretation Produce
Indeterminate Results

This Section explains that the disagreement among the circuit
courts about how many crimes § 924(c) defines persists because
the first-order tools of statutory interpretation do not conclusively
resolve the question. It details why the statute's language, its
legislative history, and the application of the Blockburger test do
not point to a resolution.
1. The statute's language and structure are ambiguous.
The language of statutes is frequently ambiguous: "[T]he
phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment,
seldom attains more than approximate precision."'149 The plain

143

Id at 1237.

144 Timmons, 283 F3d at 1249-50.
145 Id at 1247-48.
146

Owens, 224 Fed Appx at 430, quoting Combs, 369 F3d at 931,

147 Owens, 224 Fed Appx at 430.
148

Id.

149 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum L Rev

527, 528 (1947). See also Singer and Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 45:1 at 1-6 (cited in note 59) (explaining that statutes are often ambiguous because
language itself is ambiguous).
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language of § 924(c) offers little insight into the number of
crimes it creates. Section 924(c)(1)(A) reads:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm,
or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime-(i) be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the
firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 10 years. 150
This statutory text does clearly describe two separate acts: first,
"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking ... us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm," and second, "in furtherance of any such crime, possess[ing] a firearm."'151 It does not
say, however, if these acts are two distinct crimes or two alternative means of committing a single crime.152
The structure is also indeterminate. The fact that the statute
does not locate the two prongs in separate subsections may initially suggest that they constitute a single crime. The other subsections of § 924 each set out one crime and the applicable penalties. For example, § 924(b) provides that, in connection with
some forms of criminal activity, "[w]hoever... ships, transports,
or receives a firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign
commerce shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both."'1 3 Section 924(c) similarly describes
the prohibited conduct and then establishes the applicable

150 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
151 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
152 In Schad v Arizona, 501 US 624 (1991) (Souter) (plurality), a plurality of the
Court, interpreting the Arizona first-degree murder and felony-murder statutes, said
that if a statute establishes two alternative means of committing a crime, these alternatives can be either parts of a single crime or separate crimes. The plurality suggested
that lower courts should look to legislative intent or past interpretations of the statute,
rather than to the text itself, in order to determine if the statute creates separate crimes
or alternative means. Id at 636-37. So even though the text clearly enumerates two different acts, Schad does not reveal whether those acts constitute separate crimes.
153 18 USC § 924(b). Similarly, § 924(d) provides that "[any firearm or ammunition
involved in or used in any knowing violation of [various subsections of §§ 922 and 924]
•.. where such intent is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, shall be subject
to seizure and forfeiture."
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penalties, making the structure of § 924(c) parallel to the structure of other sections that each define a single crime.154
Inferring that each subpart contains only a single crime,
however, "makes too much of the numbering system.155 Because
there is not an established presumption that each numbered
subpart must define one offense,156 assuming that Congress intends each subpart to contain only a single crime assumes too
much. Moreover, numbering the statutes is "often the work of
the Office of the Law Revision Counsel," not "Congress itself. 157
Trying to glean congressional intent from the numbering system is
thus ill-advised, as the numbering is not necessarily Congress's.
The fact that Congress amended § 924(c) further obscures
whether it includes two crimes. When Congress amends a statute,
"Different offenses may end up as different paragraphs precisely
because drafters do not want to renumber other subsections,
whose designations have become familiar."1s85 Moreover, "changing one subsection's designation in order to make room for another can wreak havoc with cross-references elsewhere in the
United States Code. Prudent drafters prefer to avoid that risk,
even if it means adding paragraphs or sub-parts to other subdivisions of a statute."159
2. The legislative history does not address the question of
how many crimes § 924(c) defines.
"Legislative history is often ambiguous and inconclusive" for
two reasons. 160 First, Congress is comprised of many individuals,
who do not necessarily have a singular intention when they pass
154 See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (describing prohibited conduct in § 924(c)(1)(A)
and outlining the penalties in each subsection).
155 United States v Loniello, 610 F3d 488, 492 (7th Cir 2010).
156 Id.
157 Id. The Law Revisions Counsel "converts the Statutes at Large into the United
States Code." Id.
158 Id.
159 Loniello, 610 F3d at 492 (citation omitted).
160 Singer and Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48:2 at 548 (cited in
note 59). See also United States v Public Utilities Commission of California,345 US 295,
319 (1953) (Jackson concurring):
I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could reach it by analysis
of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress. When we decide from
legislative history, including statements of witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we must put ourselves in the place of a majority of
Congressmen and act according to the impression we think this history should
have made on them.
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a law.161 Because there can be as many intentions as there are
individual members of Congress, there may be no one intent
that is readily discernible from floor debates, drafts, and reports.
Second, and most relevant to the question of statutory interpretation at hand, legislative history does not necessarily speak to
every question that a statute may raise.
The legislative history of § 924(c) does not reveal how many
crimes it defines. None of the legislative history materials addresses the question.162 The legislative history of § 924(c) makes
two points clear. First, members of Congress amended the statute to "restore" § 924(c) as the "crime fighting tool" it was preBailey.163 Second, while members of Congress did want to make
§ 924(c) prosecutions easier, at least one member suggested that
they also wanted to ensure that "someone who possesses a gun
that has nothing to do with the crime does not fall under
924(c)."164 In these discussions, however, members of Congress
did not address whether possession of a gun in furtherance of a
crime constitutes a crime separate from use of a gun during a
crime.
3. The Blockburger test determines whether multiple
punishments are constitutional, not how many crimes a
statute defines.
165
Finally, there are two reasons why the Blockburger test
does not indicate how many crimes § 924(c) defines. First, application of the Blockburger test will help answer whether it is constitutionally permissible for a statute to define two separate
crimes, but not whether the statute actually defines two separate crimes. Although some courts do apply the Blockburger test
in determining how many crimes a statute defines, this use of
the test is erroneous. Just because a statute can permissibly
define two separate crimes under Blockburger does not mean

161 See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It" Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 239 (1992).
162 See, for example, HR Rep No 105-344 at 2-4 (cited in note 36) (omitting mention
of the number of offenses § 924(c) creates in a statement of why an amendment to the
statute is needed); 144 Cong Rec at S 12670-71 (cited in note 34) (statement of Senator
DeWine); United States v Pleasant, 125 F Supp 2d 173, 180-81 (ED Va 2000) (discussing
the legislative history).
163 144 Cong Rec at S 12670 (cited in note 34) (statement of Senator DeWine).
164 Id at S 12671.
165 See Part II.B.
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that it actually does.166 As the Ninth Circuit noted in UCO Oil,
"The fact that a statute encompasses various modes of violation
requiring different elements of proof ... does not compel" the
conclusion that the statute creates separate offenses. 167 That is,
Blockburger sets a constitutional floor for when a statute may
define two separate offenses, but does not answer the statutory
interpretation question of how many crimes a statute actually
defines. Interpreting § 924(c) as defining two separate crimes
may be constitutionally permissible under Blockburger, but that
does not mean that it is correct.
Second, application of the Blockburger test also does not
determine whether § 924(c) can constitutionally define two separate crimes. The Supreme Court takes inconsistent approaches
to cases involving two crimes when commission of one of the
crimes necessarily involves committing all the acts that constitute the second crime, as is the case with § 924(c). 168
For example, in Ball v United States,169 the Court addressed
prohibitions on possession and receipt of firearms. The Court
held that because receipt necessarily involves possession, the
two crimes were the same for double jeopardy purposes. 170 The
Court explained that "Congress intended a felon in Ball's position to be convicted and punished for only one of the two offenses
if the possession of the firearm is incidental to receiving it."171 By
contrast, in United States v Woodward,172 the Court held that
two crimes were separate even though the same conduct formed
the basis of each count and the conduct necessary to violate one
statute could involve violating the other. 173 Woodward addressed
the prohibition on willful failure to report carrying more than
$5,000 into the United States and the prohibition on making a
166 While United States v Dixon, 509 US 688 (1993), established that only the Blockburger test must be satisfied for two charges to permissibly be considered separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes, it did not hold that alternative means for committing a crime must be considered separate offenses just because they satisfy the
Blockburger separate-elements test. See id at 703-04. Moreover, the Schad plurality
found that statutory alternatives do not inherently define separate elements or separate
crimes. Schad, 501 US at 635-36 (Souter) (plurality).
167 UCO Oil, 546 F2d at 838.
168 See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A ProposedApproach, 92 Georgetown L J 1183, 1221 (2004).
169 470 US 856 (1985).

170
171

Id at 862.
Id at 861.

469 US 105 (1985).
Id at 106-08 (explaining that proof of a currency-reporting violation does not
necessarily include proof of a false statement offense).
172

173
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false statement to a US agency. Even though willful failure to
report is incidental to making a false statement, the Court did
not treat these two crimes as the same.174 The Court allowed
75
Woodward to be punished for both acts.'
These two decisions exemplify the ambiguity regarding how
courts should respond when statutes proscribe acts that are distinct, but when one act necessarily entails the other. Although
the Court was interpreting different statutes in these cases, the
same reasoning applies equally to two different prongs of the
same statute. The relevant question in both instances was
whether a defendant can, under Blockburger, be punished for
two different acts when completion of one act requires completion of the other.
This ambiguity undermines application of Blockburger to
§ 924(c). Two elements of § 924(c) are "use" and "possession."176
Use necessarily entails possession. 177 The Gamboa court, although apparently without recognizing the difficulty that this
creates for application of the Blockburger test, acknowledged
this overlap. It explained that "implicit in a finding that Gamboa
'used and carried' firearms lies a finding that Gamboa simultaneously 'possessed' the firearms (because it would not be possible
for him to use and carry firearms without also possessing
them).178 "Use" and "possession" are, accordingly, parallel to
receipt and possession as well as willful failure to report and
making a false statement. Because the Court has not been clear
about how to apply Blockburger to statutory elements that overlap in this way, the Blockburger test does not resolve whether
double jeopardy bars multiple punishments for both "use" and
"possession."
The third and fourth prongs of the Ninth Circuit's UCO Oil
test, which Arreola employed, also produce indeterminate results
because of this ambiguity. Like Blockburger, the third and
fourth prongs of the UCO Oil test ask whether the conduct proscribed by the two statutory provisions is distinct. 179 The ambiguity
174 See id at 107-08. See also Poulin, 92 Georgetown L J at 1221 (cited in note 168).
175 Woodward, 469 US at 109-10.
176 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).

177 See Bailey, 516 US at 144 (defining "use" as "active employment" and explaining
that "active employment" involves possession).
178 Gamboa, 439 F3d at 810. See also Combs, 369 F3d at 932 (following Bailey's definition of "use").
179 See Arreola, 467 F3d at 1159-60 (explaining application of the third and fourth
prongs of the UCO Oil test).
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about whether "use" and "possession" should be treated as distinct
thus clouds the UCO Oil test, just as it clouds the Blockburger
test.

None of the first-order tools of statutory interpretationneither the language nor the legislative history nor the Blockburger test-offers a conclusive resolution to the question of how
many crimes § 924(c) defines.
The indeterminacy produced by first-order tools of statutory
interpretation in this context raises the question of why courts
continue to rely on them. The circumstances of defendants' appeals offer some insight. In every case surveyed, the defendants
faced strong evidence against them. s0 Further, as the Haynes
court emphasized, appellate courts are generally applying the
deferential plain error standard of review.1s1 Notably, the courts
upheld defendants' convictions in all but one of these cases. In
the face of § 924(c)'s uncertainty and the limited review that appellate courts are to engage in, judges may be striving to reach
the results that they feel the facts compel 182 and mustering the
best evidence they can to do so. The first-order tools of statutory
interpretation do not, however, provide conclusive evidence supporting either reading of the statute. The next Part discusses
how the rule of lenity can better answer the question of how
many crimes § 924(c) defines.

180 For example, the Haynes defendants were involved in a crime spree so massive
that the Seventh Circuit likened it to the film Training Day. Haynes, 582 F3d at 692 n 1.
The evidence against them included wiretaps, visual surveillance, and information from
a confidential informant. Id at 692-97 & n 2. Similarly, Gamboa, who was investigated
as the leader of a methamphetamine-trafficking operation, was found with 500 grams of
methamphetamine and $9,000 in cash. Gamboa, 439 F3d at 801. That amount of methamphetamine has an approximate street value of between $50,000 and $75,000. See Department of Justice, Press Release, Twenty Individuals Charged for Their Involvement in
Methamphetamine Distribution Ring (July 11, 2012), online at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/ncw/pressreleases/Charlotte-2012-07-11-johnson.html (visited Aug 12, 2014). Finally,
Arreola was poised to sell seventy ounces of heroin to an undercover officer; a confidential
informant witnessed the transaction. Arreola, 467 F3d at 1155.
181 See Haynes, 582 F3d at 703.
182 There is a wealth of scholarship discussing indeterminacy and extralegal influ-

ences on judicial decisionmaking. See generally, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr,
The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457 (1897) (arguing that the law is not completely
determinate and that legal principles cannot be worked out like mathematics); Joseph
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L J 1
(1984) (arguing that the law is not natural or objective, but that lawyers, judges, and
scholars make political choices when shaping the law).
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III. THE RULE OF LENITY POINTS TO ONE CRIME

The first Part of this Comment explained that an amendment to § 924(c) led to disagreement over how many crimes
§ 924(c) defines. The second Part explained that disagreement
persists because the first-order tools of statutory interpretation
do not conclusively answer the question. This Part proposes that
courts look to the rule of lenity to determine whether § 924(c)
contemplates one crime or two. It begins by explaining the rule
of lenity, emphasizing that the rule should take into account the
punishment that a defendant would eventually receive as opposed to focusing exclusively on a defendant's duplicity or multiplicity challenge. It then argues that, because the rule of lenity
requires courts to consider how much punishment a defendant
will receive, the rule instructs courts to interpret statutesincluding § 924(c)-as defining fewer crimes.
A.

The Rule of Lenity Guides Courts' Interpretations of
Ambiguous Criminal Statutes

Because first-order tools of statutory interpretation do not
resolve the question of how many crimes § 924(c) defines, courts
must look to second-order tools such as the canons of statutory
construction. 83
The rule of lenity is a canon of construction that instructs
courts to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants. 1 4 It is the canon most directly applicable to ambiguous
criminal statutes, and in practice courts commonly rely on the
rule of lenity when faced with such statutes. 8 5
183 See Bell v United States, 349 US 81, 83-84 (1955) (noting that when Congress
leaves a statute's meaning ambiguous, courts should resolve the statutory doubt 'infavor
of lenity). For a general discussion of the canons of statutory interpretation, see Statutes,
82 Corpus Juris Secundum § 364 at 448-51 (2009).
184 See United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 514 (2008) (Scalia) (plurality) (explaining
and applying the rule of lenity); United States v Granderson,511 US 39, 54 (1994) ("In
these circumstances-where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
ambiguity in Granderson's favor."); United States v Wiltberger, 18 US (5 Wheat) 76, 95
(1820) ('The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly.., is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.").
185 See, for example, United States v McLemore, 28 F3d 1160, 1164-65 (11th Cir 1994):

The language of section 924(h) is not plain on its face. The legislative history is
extremely sparse, and that which exists gives us little guidance as to the scope
of the term "crime of violence" as it is used in section 924(h). Finally, the statutory scheme is similarly unhelpful. . . . When a criminal statute is ambiguous
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While the canons of statutory construction have generally
fallen into disrepute among scholars, 186 the utility of the rule of
lenity, as opposed to other canons, is recognized by many scholars, 187 as well as the Court.188 The rule's information-forcing capacity is a key reason for scholars' endorsement. When courts
disagree about how to properly interpret a statute, it is desirable
to employ a canon that creates incentives for the legislature to
provide a robust articulation of law.1S9 The rule of lenity encourages legislatures to draft statutes clearly if they want to ensure
that laws are not underenforced. Professor William Eskridge explains that the rule of lenity is "particularly important in statutory

in its application to certain conduct, the rule of lenity requires it to be construed narrowly.
See also United States v Jones, 986 F2d 42, 44 (3d Cir 1993) ("[W]e would nevertheless
have to conclude that 'the court' in this context is at least ambiguous. Having so concluded,
we would be constrained to hold that the rule of lenity favors the district court's reading
over that of the government."); United States v Lindsay, 985 F2d 666, 673 (2d Cir 1993)
("If we conclude that congress's intent is ambiguous, the rule of lenity would require us
to conclude that the government may charge only one violation of § 924(c)(1) where the
defendant uses multiple firearms in relation to a single drug trafficking offense."); United
States v Archer, 461 F Supp 2d 213, 219 (SDNY 2006) ("To the extent the language can
be interpreted otherwise, the Court agrees ... that the question is 'at least ambiguous.'
Thus, the rule of lenity applies."); United States v Harkey, 709 F Supp 977, 984 (ED
Wash 1989) ("[D]ue to the ambiguity in § 924(e), and the limited guidance offered by the
legislative history, coupled with the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Chatman, the rule
of lenity requires this court to construe § 924(e) in favor of the accused.").
186 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395
(1950). See also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U Chi L Rev 800, 805 (1983):
To exaggerate slightly, it has been many years since any legal scholar had a
good word to say about any but one or two of the canons, but scholarly opinion
...has had little impact on the writing of judicial opinions, where the canons
seem to be flourishing as vigorously as ever.
187 See, for example, Leading Cases, 122 Harv L Rev 276, 483 (2008):
The Court's ready invocation of lenity ... signal[ed] its reluctance to continue
granting the government the benefit of an ambiguous wording. By interpreting
ambiguous portions of the criminal code with a maximum of deference to the
defendant, the Court placed the burden of clarity where it belongs: squarely in
the halls of Congress.
See also, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes
and the Constitution, 49 U Chi L Rev 263, 280 (1982) (explaining the benefits of the rule
of lenity); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev 345,
349 (noting that "[llenity is almost universally celebrated among commentators").
188 See note 184.
189 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation
and Statutory Interpretation8 (Foundation 2000) (describing the rule of lenity as forcing
specificity); United States v Taylor, 487 US 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia concurring).
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interpretation" because it "often impels the Court to demand
greater precision from elderly criminal statutes." 9o Professor

Stephen Smith also explains, "To the extent legislatures generally share prosecutors' desire for broad criminal prohibitions, a
rigidly enforced rule of lenity would operate as an informationforcing default rule, giving legislatures added incentive to make
their wishes known ex ante."191 Moreover, narrow construction of

criminal statutes provides "fair warning of what has been prohibited."192 The rule of lenity incentivizes Congress to be clearer
in the first instance. If Congress does not approve of courts' lenient
interpretation of a statute, it can amend the statute to ensure
that courts interpret it differently in future cases. Thus, the
information-forcing capacity of the rule of lenity operates both
ex ante, to encourage clearer statutes in the future, and ex post,
to facilitate amendment of statutes that are being interpreted in
a manner inconsistent with Congress's intentions. For example,
Congress introduced the 1998 amendment in response to the
narrow definition of "use" that Bailey established.
Having explained some benefits of the rule of lenity, it is
now necessary to address its scope. The rule of lenity instructs
courts not only to consider if the defendant will be convicted, but
also to construe statutes to expose defendants to less punishment. In Bifulco v United States,193 the Court observed that the

rule of lenity "applies not only to interpretations of the substantive
190 William N. Eskridge Jr, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 Yale L J 331, 374, 376 (1991).
191 Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J Crim L & Criminol 537,
580-81 (2012). See also Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L Rev 885, 887 (2004) ("[Ihe rule of lenity serves an interest in disclosure. It compels
legislatures to detail the breadth of prohibitions in advance of their enforcement.... Without the rule, politicians might prefer to choose broad language that obscures the extent to
which criminal laws encompass unremarkable conduct."); Einer Elhauge, PreferenceEliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L Rev 2162, 2194 (2002):
By providing the most lenient reading in ambiguous cases, the rule of lenity
forces the legislature to define just how anti-criminal they wish to be. . . . [A]n
overly narrow interpretation is far more likely to be corrected by statutory interpretation because prosecutors and other members of anti-criminal lobbying
groups are heavily involved in legislative drafting and can more readily get on
the legislative agenda.
192 David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation,67 NYU L
Rev 921, 935 (1992). See also United States v Rodriquez, 553 US 377, 404-05 (2008)
(Souter dissenting); Eskridge, 101 Yale L J at 413-14 (cited in note 190) ('This rule
serves the representation-reinforcing goal of protecting a relatively powerless group
(people accused of committing crimes) and the normativist goal of injecting due process
values of notice, fairness, and proportionality into the political process.").
193 447 US 381 (1980).
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ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they
impose."194
The Court has also noted that the rule cautions against
reading multiple crimes into a statute. In Bell v United States,195
the Supreme Court explained:
When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. . . . [11f Congress does not fix the
punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses, when we have no more to go
on than the present case furnishes.196
In Bell, the defendant was charged with two violations of the
Mann Act, 197 which prohibited transporting in interstate commerce "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.198 The two counts
stemmed from a single trip during which Bell transported two
different women. 199 Bell argued that he had committed only a
single offense and thus could not be subject to separate punishment for each woman. 200 The Court acknowledged that the statute
was ambiguous.201 It concluded that, when faced with ambiguous
criminal statutes, courts must interpret them as imposing less
punishment.202 Based on this reasoning, the Court held that Bell
had committed only one violation of the Mann Act.203
Neither Bell nor the other cases in which the Court has applied the rule of lenity to punishment have discussed application

194 Id at 387. See also Rodriquez, 553 US at 404-05 (Souter dissenting); Ladner v
United States, 358 US 169, 177-78 (1958) (suggesting that courts choose a harsher punishment only when Congress speaks in "clear and definite" language). For a criticism of
applying the rule of lenity to punishment, see Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of
Lenity, 33 U Toledo L Rev 511, 514 (2002) (claiming that justifications for using the rule
of lenity for sentencing are "weak at best," and advocating that a "lesser" rule of lenity be
applied specifically to sentencing).
195 349 US 81 (1955).
196 Id at 83-84.
197 18 USC § 2421.
198 Bell, 349 US at 82, quoting 18 USC § 2421.
199 Bell, 349 US at 82.

200

Id.

201

See id at 83 ("[One] could persuasively and not unreasonably reach either of the

conflicting constructions [of the statute].").
202 See id.
203 Bell, 349 US at 83-84.
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of the rule to determining how many crimes a statute defines.204
Nonetheless, these cases broadly instruct courts to apply the rule
of lenity to punishment,205 which necessarily includes considering
how many crimes a defendant will ultimately be convicted of.
Finally, note that the rule of lenity's information-forcing capacity applies equally to the punishment-focused application of
the rule. By refusing to impose punishment that Congress has
not transparently called for, courts encourage Congress to be explicit: if members of Congress think a particular sentence should
206
attach to a certain crime, they must say so.
B.

Application of the Rule of Lenity to the Question of How
Many Crimes § 924(c) Defines

With that groundwork laid, this Comment will now explain
why the rule of lenity indicates that § 924(c) defines a single
crime. Only one court (the Eastern District of North Carolina)
has ever applied the rule of lenity to this question.07 That
court's use of the rule of lenity seems consistent with this Comment's argument, but the court offers too little explanation to
2 08
fully guide other courts or commentators.
This Comment argues that courts must look past the questions immediately before them and consider longer-term questions
like how much punishment defendants may face. Considering
these longer-term issues, courts should hold that § 924(c) defines
204 See, for example, Bifulco, 447 US at 387; Ladner, 358 US at 177 (noting that the
defendant could be charged with a number of offenses commensurate with the number of
victims, but not clarifying how the rule of lenity would impact the number of offenses
charged, if at all).
205 See, for example, Bifulco, 447 US at 387, 400; Ladner, 358 US at 177-78.
206 See Eskridge, 101 Yale L J at 376 (cited in note 190).
207 See United States v Latham, 903 F Supp 2d 354, 357 (ED NC 2012) (citation

omitted):
Further, the rule of lenity requires that doubt be resolved against turning a
single transaction into multiple offenses. Here, defendant asks this Court to
recognize § 924(c) as criminalizing two separate offenses and to dismiss count
eleven as duplicitous. Given the statute's legislative history and the rule of lenity, the Court declines to do so. As such, defendants [sic] motion to dismiss
count eleven as duplicitous is denied.
See also United States v Jefferson, 302 F Supp 2d 1295, 1301-02 (MD Ala 2004) (explaining
that "[i]f this were a matter of first impression, this court would be guided by the rule of
lenity," and noting the "unjust[ness]" of the sentence); Recent Case, Criminal LawStatutory Interpretation-NinthCircuit Holds That 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A) Defines a Single Firearm Offense, 121 Harv L Rev 668, 675 (2007) (suggesting that a "refined" rule of
lenity might apply to the question of how many crimes § 924(c) creates).
208 See Latham, 903 F Supp 2d at 357.
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a single crime. Finally, this Comment responds to arguments
against applying the rule of lenity to § 924(c).
1. Because the rule of lenity instructs courts to consider
how much punishment defendants will receive, courts
should interpret § 924(c) as defining a single crime.
First, note that if courts interpreting § 924(c) do not look
past the challenge immediately before them (for example,
whether to hold that an indictment is duplicitous), the rule of
lenity may not resolve the question of how many crimes § 924(c)
defines. Defendants who raise duplicity challenges seek a ruling
that § 924(c) defines a single crime, whereas defendants who
raise multiplicity challenges seek a ruling that § 924(c) defines
two crimes.29 If courts consider only whether to find for a defendant on the narrow issue before them, the rule of lenity does
not suggest any particular result.
However, if courts look past the immediate issue to how
much punishment the defendant might ultimately receive, the
rule of lenity indicates that § 924(c) defines a single crime because this interpretation will lead to less punishment. A sentence for two § 924(c) violations instead of one could be the difference between five and thirty years, or between thirty years
and life. This is because § 924(c) violations can trigger statutory
mandatory minimum sentences for a "second or subsequent conviction" that run consecutively with the sentence for the first
conviction.210 A second § 924(c) conviction carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty-five years; the mandatory minimum
increases to life imprisonment if the firearm is a machine gun or
is equipped with a silencer.211 Per the mandatory minimum, if
§ 924(c) defines two separate crimes, a defendant who both used
a handgun during a crime and possessed that handgun in furtherance of the same crime could face an additional twenty-five
years, even if the use and possession charges flowed from the

209
210
211

See Part II.A.
18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C).
18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C):

In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person
shall(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years; and
(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
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same conduct.22 That is, someone who had a gun on his person
during a drug transaction and threatened to use it, or someone
who traded a gun for drugs, could have committed two crimes,
be sentenced separately for those crimes, and receive a sentencing enhancement for a second offense. By contrast, if § 924(c) defines a single crime that can be committed in either of two ways,
the same defendant could be convicted only once for having a
gun on his person and threatening to use it, or for trading a gun
for drugs.213 He would face a five-year sentence instead of a
twenty-five-year sentence.
Looking past issues immediately before the court to the
sentence also makes sense in light of the minimal benefit to the
defendant of winning a duplicity or multiplicity challenge. A
finding that an indictment is multiplicitous or duplicitous usually
does not require dismissal of the indictment,214 so the case
against the defendant may proceed even if he prevails. If an
See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(C).
There are ways to ensure that defendants do not face multiple sentences for essentially the same conduct. First, the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") contain a Grouping Provision that advises courts to impose a single sentence for
"[a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm"; this provision cautions against imposing multiple sentences for similar conduct that constitutes multiple crimes. Guidelines § 3D1.2. However, the Guidelines explicitly exempt § 924(c) from the Grouping
Provision. See Guidelines § 2K2.4(b) ("[Ilf the defendant, whether or not convicted of another crime, was convicted of violating section 924(c) ...the guideline sentence is the
minimum term of imprisonment required by statute. [The Grouping Provision] ...shall
not apply to that count of conviction."). Second, some courts hold that each § 924(c) conviction must stem from a different predicate offense. See United States v Diaz, 592 F3d
467, 475 (3d Cir 2010) (vacating one of two § 924(c) convictions after concluding that a
single underlying drug trafficking offense cannot be the predicate for multiple § 924(c)
convictions); United States v Franklin,321 F3d 1231, 1241 (9th Cir 2003) (same); United
States v Anderson, 59 F3d 1323, 1334 (DC Cir 1995) (holding that only one § 924(c) violation may be charged per predicate offense); United States v Cappas, 29 F3d 1187, 1195
(7th Cir 1994) (affirming the dismissal of two of three counts under § 924(c) because the
defendant committed only what "Congress intended to be one offense"); United States v
Privette, 947 F2d 1259, 1262 (5th Cir 1991) ("Multiple sentences under § 924(c) must be
based upon the number of drug trafficking crimes in which firearms were used."). However, other courts allow defendants to be charged with multiple counts of § 924(c) violations for simultaneous conduct stemming from the same predicate offense. See United
States v Camps, 32 F3d 102, 106-07 (4th Cir 1994) (concluding that a single underlying
drug trafficking offense can be the predicate for multiple § 924(c) convictions); United
States v Lucas, 932 F2d 1210, 1223 (8th Cir 1991) (same); Jefferson, 302 F Supp 2d at
1302 (following other circuits' precedent dictating that two convictions for violations of
§ 924 stemming from simultaneous conduct trigger the sentencing enhancement under
§ 924(c)(1)(C)). In the other circuits (including the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh, which
hold that § 924(c) defines two offenses), the question whether a single predicate offense
can be the basis of multiple § 924(c) convictions is unresolved. See Part II.D.
214 See Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practiceand Procedure:Criminal § 145 at 94, 98
(cited in note 47) (explaining that duplicity and multiplicity are not fatal to the indictment).
212

213
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indictment is found to be multiplicitous, the prosecution can
choose which count to proceed on. 215 Winning a duplicity challenge can actually put the defendant in a worse position. If the
indictment is duplicitous, the prosecution may file a superseding
indictment that charges the defendant with both crimes.216 So if
a defendant wins a duplicity challenge, he may be reindicted for
two crimes and sentenced separately for each.217 With a few narrow exceptions, double jeopardy does not preclude reindictment
after an indictment is dismissed.218 Finally, as noted above, if the
defendant does not raise the challenge until after trial, the deferential plain error standard of review applies.219 Even if the defendant prevails under this standard, the prosecution can still
reindict. While the effects of winning a duplicity or multiplicity
challenge are therefore minimal, the effects of being convicted of
two crimes instead of one can be stark, as the example of
§ 924(c)'s operation shows.
In drafting § 924(c), Congress was not explicit that defendants should face multiple punishments for essentially the same
conduct. Because Congress was not explicit, the rule of lenity
cautions against interpreting § 924(c) as defining two crimes.
Moreover, even in jurisdictions where a single underlying drug
trafficking offense cannot be the predicate for multiple § 924(c)
convictions, being charged with more crimes can still have negative effects on a defendant. For example, being charged with two
crimes may affect plea bargaining, eligibility for parole, social
stigma, and whether a defendant qualifies as a repeat offender
under repeat offender statutes or the Career Offender Guideline.220 Therefore, courts should apply the rule of lenity to the
215 See id at 98-100.
216 See 41 Am Jur 2d Indictments and Informations § 54 at 801.
217 See United States v Combs, 218 Fed Appx 483, 484 (6th Cir 2007) (discussing the
case's procedural posture, wherein the prosecution reindicted Combs in response to the
appellate court's holding that § 924(c) defined two separate crimes).
218 See 41 Am Jur 2d Indictments and Informations § 46 at 791-92 (explaining that
the prosecution can reindict a defendant unless the indictment was dismissed: (1) "for
want of prosecution"; (2) on motion by the government under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48(a) (which allows for discretionary dismissals by the government); (3) "on
motion by the government on the sole grounds of the interest of justice"; (4) "for a violation of the federal Speedy Trial Act"; or (5) "because of willful and flagrant prosecutorial
misconduct"). See also Illinois v Somerville, 410 US 458, 470 (1973) (explaining that a
defendant may be reindicted even after jeopardy attaches).
219 See text accompanying notes 47-51.
220 See Guidelines § 4B1.1. See also Ball, 470 US at 864-65 (explaining that multiple convictions for a single offense have negative effects beyond sentence length; for example, multiple convictions "may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole," "result in
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question of how many crimes § 924(c) creates. Courts should
hold that § 924(c) defines a single crime that can be committed
two different ways, not two distinct crimes. Interpreting the
statute to define a single crime complies with the rule of lenity
because it exposes defendants to less-severe punishment.
Before addressing a few counterarguments, this Comment
concludes its explanation of how to apply the rule of lenity to
§ 924(c) by considering the effect that the more lenient interpretation of § 924(c) could have on a defendant's sentence. Recall
that Gamboa was convicted of two counts of violating § 924(c)one for using firearms during a drug trafficking crime and one
for possessing the same weapons during the same drug trafficking crime.21 Not only did each crime involve identical firearms
and drug trafficking, but the alleged facts did not distinguish
the act of "use" from the act of "possession."222 Consequently, if
§ 924(c) defined only a single crime, Gamboa could have been
charged with only a single count of violating § 924(c). Gamboa
received a thirty-year sentence on the first § 924(c) conviction
under the machine gun enhancement23 and a life sentence for
the second § 924(c) conviction.24 If he had been charged with only
one count of violating § 924(c), he would have received just the
thirty-year sentence.
2. The arguments against applying the rule of lenity to
§ 924(c) are unavailing.
This Comment now turns to discussing potential counterarguments. One might argue that the rule of lenity should not
apply to § 924(c) because, members of Congress were explicit
that the purpose of the 1998 amendment to § 924(c) was to aid
criminal prosecutions.225 The intention of legislators to aid
prosecutions of § 924(c) violations may suggest that application
of the rule of lenity is inappropriate. However, the Supreme
Court has explicitly rebuffed the argument that an intention to
aid prosecutions justifies casting aside the rule of lenity. The Court
has explained that the legislature cannot express its intention to
an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense," or "be used to impeach the defendant's credibility").
221 Gamboa, 439 F3d at 800-01.
222

See id at 810.

223 Brief for Appellant, United States v Gamboa, No 03-2196, *9 (8th Cir filed Jan

14, 2004).
224 Gamboa, 439 F3d at 800-01.
225 See text accompanying notes 33-38.
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make prosecutions easier and then rely on courts to interpret
ambiguous statutes as maximally punitive based on that stated
intention. In United States v Santos,226 a plurality of the Supreme Court explained that the government cannot ask the
Court to "resolve the statutory ambiguity in light of Congress's
presumptive intent to facilitate [] prosecutions" because "[t]hat
position turns the rule of lenity upside down."227 The plurality
added, decisively, '"We interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in
8
favor of defendants, not prosecutors."22
Other critics of the rule of lenity complain that courts do not
always apply it, creating some unpredictability.229 The argument
that courts do not consistently apply the rule of lenity is not an
argument that courts should not apply the rule at all, however.
Moreover, the sentencing-focused approach to the rule of lenity
makes the rule's application much more straightforward. This
approach asks courts to reach the result that will lead to more
lenient sentences for defendants. Determining which outcome
will result in lower sentences across the board is simpler than
attempting to apply the rule of lenity to intermediate decisions
in criminal cases, like those dealing with whether to uphold
indictments.
The rule of lenity may not offer a perfect solution. It provides, however, the best way to achieve a uniform interpretation
of § 924(c) as well as other statutes that may define one or multiple crimes. The rule of lenity can readily be applied to other
questions of how many crimes an ambiguous statute creates.
When it is not clear whether a statute defines one or two crimes,
the rule points to interpreting the statute in whatever way will
expose defendants to less punishment. Therefore, the rule of lenity
will always point to interpreting statutes as defining one crime
instead of multiple crimes.
Attempts to interpret § 924(c) do point to one limitation of
the rule of lenity. An initial ruling in favor of a defendant does
not always benefit the defendant in the long run. If a ruling does
not implicate long-term consequences for a defendant (as sentencing does), the rule of lenity may not point in favor of any
one interpretation. Focusing on long-term over short-term
553 US 507 (2008).
Id at 519 (Scalia) (plurality).
228 Id (Scalia) (plurality).
229 See, for example, Kahan, 1994 S Ct Rev at 346 & n 3 (cited in note 187) ("Judicial
enforcement of lenity is notoriously sporadic and unpredictable.).
226
227
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consequences makes it possible for the rule to resolve questions of
interpretation that it would not otherwise seem to address. At
the same time, considering long-term consequences may indicate
the inability of the rule of lenity to solve other problems of statutory interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Circuits are split as to whether § 924(c) creates two distinct
crimes or alternative means of committing a single crime. The
first-order tools of statutory interpretation do not conclusively
answer that question. This Comment explains how courts might
invoke the rule of lenity to determine how many crimes § 924(c)
creates. It emphasizes that the rule of lenity instructs courts to
construe statutes so as to impose less punishment. This means
construing statutes to define fewer crimes. With this point in
mind, courts can apply the rule of lenity to the question of how
many crimes § 924(c) creates. Following the rule of lenity, courts
must construe § 924(c) as defining a single crime because this
interpretation would expose defendants to less punishment.
This solution is applicable beyond § 924(c). By explaining
that considering long-term consequences like punishment requires courts to interpret statutes as defining fewer crimes, this
Comment helps to clarify the rule of lenity writ large. As clarified,
the rule of lenity offers a solution any time a court must determine whether an ambiguous statute creates one or two crimes.

